Improper Delegation of Decision-Making Responsibility Within the NLRB, KFC National Management Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1974) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1974 Issue 4 
January 1974 
Improper Delegation of Decision-Making Responsibility Within the 
NLRB, KFC National Management Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298 (2d 
Cir. 1974) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Improper Delegation of Decision-Making Responsibility Within the NLRB, KFC National Management Corp. 
v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1974), 1974 WASH. U. L. Q. 778 (1974). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/7 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
IMPROPER DELEGATION OF DECISIOx-MAING RESPONSIBILITY
WiTmN Tim NLRB
KFC National Management Corp. v. NLRB,
497 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1974)
Petitioner corporation sought review by the court of appeals of an
adverse decision rendered by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) in an unfair praotice proceeding.' Petitioner asserted that
the Board had used improper procedure in denying a request to re-
view the regional director's dismissal of the company's claim that a
representation election was invalid. Specifically, the petition alleged
that the denials of the request for review were made by a panel com-
posed of one Board member and two staff assistants to whom the
power to vote had been improperly delegated.2  The Second Circuit
1. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 83 L.R.R.M. 1534 (1973).
2. KFC Nat'1 Mgmt. Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1974). The corpo-
ration contested the election on the grounds of pro-union activity by supervisory employ-
ees. After an ex parte investigation into the company's claims, the regional director
concluded that the claims had "no merit" and that the union should be certified as the
duly elected bargaining representative. Id. at 299. The company then petitioned the
NLRB for review. On September 7, 1972, petitioner was informed by telegram that the
request had been denied "as it raise[d] no substantial issues warranting review." Id.
at 300. A further petition for reconsideration was similarly denied by telegram. Both
denials were signed "By direction of the Board." Id.
The company refused to bargain with the union, and the union filed an unfair labor
practice charge. In its answer to the unfair practice charge, the company for the first
time raised the issue of the impropriety of the Board's procedure. The Board held
against the corporation, rejecting the procedural objection as an unjustified intrusion into
its decision-making process. KFC Nat'1 Mgmt. Co., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 83 L.R.R.M.
1534 (1973). In its petition to the court of appeals, the company moved for a supple-
mental list of materials relating to the procedure followed by the Board in issuing the
challenged denials of review. On October 17, 1973, the court denied the motion, "except
'to the limited extent' of requiring 'that the Board shall serve and file a detailed state-
ment showing the extent and date of the participation of members Miller, Fanning and
Jenkins in the consideration of the Employer's request and motion. . . ."' KFC Nat'l
Mgmt. Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298, 301 (1974) (emphasis omitted). The Executive
Secretary of the Board forwarded an affidavit stating:
"Member Jenkins was personally present and Chairman Miller and Member
Fanning were each represented by an attorney assistant employed on his re-
spective staff who had been authorized to cast a vote for him at the said
agenda. The vote at the agenda was unanimous to deny review."
Id. The court found that -the "authorizations referred to were quite general in nature"
and that there was "no evidence that the members normally review the votes cast by
their staff assistants." Id.
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Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the decision of the Board, re-
manded the petition to the Board for review of the action of the re-
gional director, and held: The National Labor Relations Act and
fundamental concepts of administrative due process require that, when
Board members are required to make a quasi-judicial decision, their
responsibility not be delegated by issuing to subordinates a gen-
eral authorization to make that decision.3
Courts have in the past been unwilling to hold improper an admin-
3. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298, 306 (2d Cir. 1974).
The procedure to be followed in representation disputes is authorized by the National
Labor Relations Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1970):
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members
any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. The Board is also au-
thorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers under section 159 of
this title to . . . certify the results [of bargaining elections], except that upon
the filing of a request therefor with the Board by any interested person, the
Board may review any action of a regional director delegated to him under this
paragraph .... mhree members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute
a quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of
any group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof.
In 1961 the Board exercised this authority, reserving the right to review on four differ-
ent grounds. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67 (1974) provides:
(c) The Board will grant a request for review only where compelling rea-
sons exist therefor. Accordingly, a request for review may be granted only
upon one or more of the following grounds:
(I) That a substantial question of law or policy is raised because of (i)
the absence of, or (ii) a departure from, officially reported Board precedent.
(2) That the regional director's decision on a substantial factual issue is
clearly erroneous on the record and such error prejudicially affects the rights
of a party.
(3) That the conduct of the hearing or any ruling made in connection with
the proceeding has resulted in prejudicial error.
(4) That there are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an important
Board rule or policy.
In Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137 (1971), the Supreme Court held that
the National Labor Relations Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1970), authorizes dis-
cretionary, not mandatory, plenary review by the NLRB of the regional directors' deci-
sions. See C. Momuus, Tim DEVELOPiNG LABoR LAw 825-29 (1971); id. at 139 (Supp.
1972).
If an employer wishes to challenge the representation decision in court, he must wait
until the Board seeks enforcement of an unfair labor practice order. Magnesium Casting
Co. v. NLRB, supra at 139. But cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) (district
court held to have jurisdiction to grant union's motion to set aside Board unit determina-
tion). The representation decision accompanies the unfair labor practice charge to the
Board and to the court of appeals. Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, supra at 142-
43. Although the Board need not consider the unit determination when deciding the
unfair practice charge, id. at 139, the court will consider the case as a whole and deter-
mine whether the findings of the Board and/or regional director are supported by
substantial evidence, id. at 143-44.
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istrator's delegation of quasi-judicial responsibility. 4  This unwilling-
ness stems from a practical appreciation of the heavy burden borne by
an administrator in this capacity, and from a desire to protect from ju-
dicial inquiry the privacy of the administrator's decision-making proc-
ess.
5
In 1936 the Supreme Court held in Morgan v. United Stateso
(Morgan 1) that the Secretary of Agriculture, in fixing rates under the
Packers and Stockyards Act, was exercising powers that were in their
nature judicial and that fundamental procedural requirements had to
be followed. Among these was the requirement that an order pursu-
ant to the statute be based on evidence and arguments heard and con-
sidered by the Secretary himself. When the Secretary's assistant alone
heard ,the evidence and arguments, an order resulting therefrom
would be invalid. 7
4. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Utica Mu-
tual Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967);
Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 291 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1961); Willapoint Oysters,
Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); Norris &
Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 163 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 867
(1948).
5. In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 461, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the
court stated:
We agree with Professor Davis, 2 ADmINisTRAvw L.Aw § 11.07 at 66
(1958), that "despite its immediately appealing quality, the broad ideal that
agency heads should do personally what they purport to do is for many func-
tions impractical and unworkable. . . ." The use of assistants in the adminis-
trative process is indispensible to the orderly and efficient expedition of great
volumes of work and the reconciliation of divergent responsibilities ...
The general rule remains that a party is not entitled to probe the delib-
erations of administrative officials, oversee their relationships with their as-
sistants, or screen the internal documents and communications they utilize.
"Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny . . . so the integrity
of the administrative process must be equally respected."
See cases cited note 4 supra. See generally 2 K. DAviS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATSE
§ 11.07 (1958).
6. 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
7. Id. at 481. On remand, the district court decided that the statutory require-
ments had been met. Morgan v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 380 (W.D. Mo. 1938). The
decision was again appealed and the order of the Secretary was held invalid because of
other procedural defects. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938). While the Sec-
retary was drafting a new order, the case was again brought to the Supreme Court on
an unrelated issue. United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939). Finally, the Secre-
tary issued a new order which was held invalid by a district court. Morgan v. United
States, 32 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Mo. 1940). On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the
order in United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). See text accompanying notes
8-9 infra.
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Following protracted litigation, the same dispute again came before
the Supreme Court in United States v. Morgan8 (Morgan IV), in which
the Court limited the holding of Morgan I. Holding that the Secre-
tary had been improperly subjected to questioning regarding the inter-
nal processes of the Department, the Court established the principle
that a court cannot inquire into the mental processes of an adminis-
trator.' Morgan IV has curtailed the power of courts to inquire into
the propriety of administrative procedures, including the extent to
which responsibility is delegated."0 No circuit, since Morgan IV, has
8. 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
9. Id. at 422, quoting Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1936), and
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938):
But the short of the business is that the Secretary should never have been sub-
jected to this examination. The proceeding before the Secretary "has a quality
resembling that of a judicial proceeding." . . . Such an examination of a
judge would be destructive of judicial responsibility. We have explicitly held
in this very litigation that "it was not the function of the court to probe the
mental processes of the Secretary." . . . Just as a judge cannot be subjected
to such a scrutiny . . . so the integrity of the administrative process must be
equally respected.
10. In National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1974),
petitioners' motion to take the deposition of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs was
denied. The court stated:
It is plain enough that if this motion had come before us in the period be-
tween the first Morgan case ...holding that in administrative proceedings
"The one who decides must hear" and that a court seized of a review proceed-
ing must inquire whether he had, and the fourth and last appearance of the
Morgan case in the Supreme Court. . .we would have been obliged to grant
it. But the life of this aspect of Morgan I was extremely brief. In Morgan
IV Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for a Court unanimous on this point, took
back most or all of what the first decision had given ....
Id. at 1144 (footnote omitted).
Since Morgan IV, courts have been unwilling to allow discovery concerning the deci-
sion-making processes of an administrator. See, e.g., Bank of Commerce v. City Nat'l
Bank, 484 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974); Davis v. Bras-
well Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1966); Air Line Pilots Ass'n
v. Quesada, 286 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1961); North Am. Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 240 F.2d
867 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 941 (1957). See generally 2 K. DAvis,
supra note 5, § 11.05.
The "mental process" rule of Morgan IV has been held inapplicable in certain situa-
tions. It is generally asserted that when a prima facie showing of impropriety has been
made, the court may inquire into the decision-making process. See Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (dictum); National Nutritional
Foods Ass'n v. FDA, supra at 1145 (dictum); S.D. Warren Co. v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 814
(1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
In Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 1964), the court
stated:
It is our opinion, therefore, that the mental process rule is but "one facet
of the general presumption of regularity" which attaches to decisions of admin-
istrative bodies. . .. Thus, we conclude, where a prima facie case of miscon-
duct is shown, justice requires that the mental process rule be held inapplicable.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/7
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held a delegation of administrative responsibility to be improper. In
such areas as the hearing of evidence," the sifting and organizing of
information,ln and the formation of preliminary decisions," the
courts have consistently held that assistants can exercise primary re-
sponsibility. The Second Circuit has gone so far as to hold that mem-
bers of administrative boards need not cast their own votes.1 4 These
same decisions, however, have uniformly acknowledged in dicta that
when a statute delegates to an administrator quasi-judicial responsibil-
ities, 'the decision in the ultimate must be that of the administrator."''
Prior to KFC National Management Corp. v. NLRB,'0 the extent
to which the principles of administrative procedure enunciated in Mor-
gan I had withstood the limitations on judicial review imposed by
Morgan IV had not been clearly defined."7  Addressing this issue, the
court in KFC began its analysis with an examination of the enabling
statute, noting that the National Labor Relations Act specifically re-
quires the Board to decide whether or not to review an action of a re-
See 78 HARv. L. 11Ev. 655 (1965); note 25 infra.
The mental process rule has also been found to be inapplicable when an administrative
decision is unaccompanied by adequate findings. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138
(1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra, noted in The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. RFv. 40, 315 (1971).
11. NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 357 U.S. 1 (1958); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); NLRB v. McKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938);
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839
(1967); NLRB v. Stocker Mfg. Co., 185 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1950); Norris & Hirshberg,
Inc. v. SEC, 163 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 867 (1948); South-
ern Garment Mfrs. Ass'n v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
12. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Great Lakes Air-
lines, Inc. v. CAB, 291 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1961); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 163
F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 867 (1948); NLRB v. Baldwin Loco-
motive Works, 128 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1942).
13. Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 291 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1961).
14. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 271 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1959) (Board members
had instructed their assistants to cast specific votes after two days of discussion by Board
with all members present).
15. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see cases
cited notes 10-14 supra.
16. 497 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1974).
17. In NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 357 U.S. 1 (1958), the NLRB delegated to
hearing officers authority to hold a preliminary hearing on a motion to revoke a sub-
poena duces tecum. The Supreme Court refused to circumscribe the limits of permissi-
ble delegation:
That degree of delegation seems to us wholly permissible under this statutory
system. We need not go further and consider the legality of the more com-
plete type of delegation to which most of the argument in the case has been
directed.
Id. at 8.Washington University Open Scholarship
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gional director in a representation dispute.' 8 The court then concluded
that since the statute clearly requires the Board to make this decision,
and since an action taken by the Board requires a quorum of two mem-
bers, the issue was whether or not this responsibility to decide could
be delegated to subordinates. 19 Looking to legislative history, the court
found that in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act,20 Congress was concerned
with the significant role played by staff attorneys in the decision-mak-
ing process,21 and thus provided for more personal adjudication by the
Board.22 Congress, the court concluded, would not have approved of
the blanket proxies issued by the Board members to their attorney as-
sistants. 23
The court then established a broader scope for its decision. Reas-
serting the principles set forth in Morgan I, the court stated that, as a
fundamental concept of administrative due process, "those legally re-
sponsible for a decision must in fact make it ... ."I' According to
the court, this principle had not been overruled by Morgan IV;
rather Morgan IV had merely established that in the absence of a
prima facie showing of improper procedure, a court wil not inquire
into an administrator's decision-making process. 25 Since the relevant
18. 497 F.2d at 302; see note 3 supra.
19. 497 F.2d at 302.
20. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-58, 159-87 (1970, Supp. Ul, 1973)).
21. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
22. 497 F.2d at 302-03. The particular provision referred to was National Labor
Relations Act § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1970), which states in part:
The Board may not employ any attorneys for the purpose of reviewing tran-
scripts of hearings or preparing drafts of opinions except that any attorney em-
ployed for assignment as a legal assistant to any Board member may for such
Board member review such transcripts and prepare such drafts. No trial exam-
iner's report shall be reviewed, either before or after its publication, by any
person other than a member of the Board or his legal assistant, and no trial
examiner shall advise or consult with the Board with respect to exceptions
taken to his findings, rulings, or recommendations.
The court in KFC also pointed out that the Taft-Hartley Conference Report discussed
the allocation of the Board's administrative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions.
No suggestion was made that the Board members should be permitted to delegate their
"quasi-judicial" function to their staff assistants beyond the reviewing of transcripts or
the preparation of draft opinions. 497 F.2d at 303, citing H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. 36-38 (1947).
23. 497 F.2d at 303; see note 27 infra.
24. 497 F.2d at 304.
25. Although the court never so stated, this concept is very much like the "pre-
sumption of regularity" interpretation of Morgan IV adopted by the court in Singer Sew-
ing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1964). As stated in United States
Vol. 1974:778] 783
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facts in KFC had been admitted by the Board, the court felt free to
review the propriety of the challenged procedure, deciding that it was,
in fact, improper.20
In its reasoning, the court seems to have confused principles of
statutory interpretation with those of administrative due process. A
careful examination of ithe legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act
shows that Congress was indeed concerned with excessive institutional
decision making on the part of the Board. The committee reports indi-
cate the desire that the NLRB begin to act more in the manner of an ap-
pellate court, each member independently arriving at his own conclu-
sions." In its affirmation of the principles enunciated in Morgan 1,
V. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926):
The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers and,
in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have
properly discharged their official duties.
See also Ross v. Stewart, 227 U.S. 530, 535 (1913). See generally 2 K. DAvis, supra
note 5, § 11.06. The Board argued that the mental process rule required the court to
presume
that administrative officials will insure that the agency decisions reflect their
views .... Where a Board member has designated a trusted senior attorney
to cast his vote on a matter, this presumption supplies a strong inference that
the member has taken adequate steps to insure that the designee will cast the
vote in accordance with the member's wishes.
Brief for Respondent at 26, KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1974).
26. 497 F.2d at 305.
27. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1947): "[IThe members of the
Board will be expected to do their own deciding, not permitting trial examiners to attend
executive sessions of the Board to defend their reports, as the Board has done in the
past." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1947):
One of the major criticisms of the Board's performance of its judicial duties
has been that the members themselves, except on the most important cases,
have fallen into the habit of delegating the reviewing of transcripts of the hear-
ings and findings of trial examiners to a unit of the general counsel's office
called the Review Section ...
m ..[he Board, instead of acting like an appellate court where the diver-
gent views of the different justices may be reflected in each decision, tends to
dispose of cases in an institutional fashion. To that extent, the congressional
purpose in having the act administered by a Board of several members has been
frustrated.
The Senate Report then goes on to assert its concurrence with the principles established
in Morgan I, quoting the following passages from the case:
"If the one who determines the facts which underlie the order has not con-
sidered evidence or argument, it is manifest that the hearing has not been
given .... The one who decides must hear.
This necessary rule does not preclude ... obtaining the aid of assistants."
Id. at 9, quoting Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1936) (Report's ellip-
sis).
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however, the KFC court also declared that the delegation of authority
was violative of administrative due process. 28 This was an unfortu-
nate choice of words, for it implies a constitutional dimension which
probably does not exist. Although the issue of delegation of adminis-
trative responsibility has been discussed in terms of due process,29
Morgan I did not do so. While the language used by Chief Justice
Hughes in Morgan I may imply a constitutional argument, the Court
merely held that the statutory "full hearing" requirement "has obvious
reference to the tradition of judicial proceedings in which evidence is
received and weighed by the trier of the facts." 30  The holding in
Morgan I was based not upon due process, but upon the statute, and
upon what Congress must have intended by requiring a "full hear-
ing." That the court in KFC may actually have intended to base its
holding strictly on the statutory language may be inferred from its sug-
gestion in a footnote that Congress might relieve the burden on the
NLRB by amending section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act
to make the regional directors' decisions final, or by reducing the
quorum requirements by one member for purposes of granting or de-
nying review by a three-member panel.3 ' Unless the courts are pre-
pared to hold that Congress does not have the sole power to specify
who shall make administrative decisions, judicial inquiry into whether
or not decisions are in fact being made by the proper persons should
be limited to examination of the enabling statutes.32
28. 497 F.2d at 306.
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Stocker Mfg. Co., 185 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1950); NLRB v.
Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1942). But cf. NLRB v. McKay Ra-
dio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
30. 298 U.S. at 480.
31. 497 F.2d at 306 n.14.
32. Except for the requirement of impartiality, there are necessarily no due process
restrictions on the power of legislatures to choose who is to do the administrative deci-
sion making. Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200
(1891); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879). In contrast, constitutional limitations
do exist on Congress' power to define the nature and extent of administrative authority.
See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Even assuming a constitutional right to the particular hearing involved in KFC, the
failure of the NLRB to accord petitioner such a hearing should not be constitutionally
fatal. A court of appeals, in a proceeding to enforce an order of the NLRB, can provide
the same review of the regional director's determinations as could the Board under its
regulations. See note 3 supra. Since the order of the NLRB must be enforced by the
court of appeals, the corporation would probably suffer no hardship as a result of the
delay in a final decision of the issue.
Vol. 1974:7781
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The NLRB has for years handled representation disputes by the
procedures held improper in KFC.33  It is unlikely, however, that the
added duties necessarily imposed by this decision will prove to be a
significant burden. 4 The extent of delegation previously held proper
will still allow Board members to escape hearing the arguments, sift-
ing the evidence, and writing the decisions. Their presence during the,
vote, or a specific authorization to a subordinate to cast a specific
vote, is all that is required.33
33. This case will alter a firmly established Board procedure. Murphy, The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board-An Appraisal, in PROCEEDINGS OF TuE TmRTEENTH AN-
NIJAL LABOR LAW INSTnTUTE, SoTrrHWEsTmtN LEGAL FOUNzDATION 113, 132-33 (1967):
Each request for review [of the regional director's representation decisions]
is studied carefully by a legal assistant and a supervisor, and an oral presenta-
tion is made to a three-man panel which decides whether or not to grant re-
view. This panel is composed of one Board member and a senior attorney
from the staff of two other Board members. The Board members rotate this
assignment every two months. The head of the unit notifies the Board mem-
ber when he has a group of cases ready for reporting, and the panel meets two
or three afternoons a week at the convenience of the Board member.
34. In terms of pure numbers of cases, the burden on the NLRB is already quite
substantial. In fiscal 1972, it received 41,000 new cases. The Board members them-
selves were called upon to decide over 2,000 cases, 176 of which were representation
cases. 37 NLRB ANN. REP. 1, 19-20, 240 (1972).
35. See cases cited notes 10-14 supra. The mental process rule and the presumption
of regularity, see notes 10 & 25 supra, would in effect allow a Board member who had
received from his assistant a summary of the evidence and a recommendation on how
to vote, but had not read the summary, to authorize his assistant to cast the recom-
mended vote. Since the court would be required to presume that the Board member had
read the summary, judicial inquiry into his participation in the decision-making process
would be precluded.
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